This paper provides the general construction of the optimal strategies in a special class of zero sum games with incomplete information, those in which the players move sequentially. It is shown that at any point of the game tree, a player's optimal behavioral strategy may be derived from a state variable involving two components: the first one keeps track of the information he revealed, the second one keeps track of the (vector) payoff he should secure over his opponent's possible position. This construction gives new insights on earlier results obtained in the context of sequential repeated games. Several examples are discussed in detail. I. Introduction. This paper is concerned with the recursive construction of optimal behavioral strategies for a class of 0-sum extensive games with incomplete information, defined as follows:
This is Lemma 2 in (Ponssard and Sorin, 1980) . Note that if in this program the optimal value of the variables v = (vS)sEs are known, the optimal value of the variables a = (air)r R E may be derived without recourse to the value of q.
Starting with some specific probability distributions po, qo we shall exhibit Player I's optimal strategy in the compounded game as:
-an optimal move on T: xr = Prob(tlr), -for each t E T an associated (p,, v,) which can then be used in (1) to derive the optimal moves in (BtrS)rER,sS.
Let us introduce the following notations: For each function g: P x Q --XR, Cavp g is the smallest real function defined on P x Q, concave w.r.t. p and greater than g on P x Q. Vexq g is defined in a dual manner. 
DEFINITION. A function g: P x Q --> R is "piecewise bilinear"
if there is a finite partition of P (resp. Q) into convex polyhedra (Ck)k K (resp. (D/)e L) such that the restriction of g to each product set Ck X DZ is bilinear. LEMMA (ii) /t E Lt(pt) for all t C T;
(iii) (ZtX tl)q > 0 forallq Q.
(b) Denoting by xt the probability of playing t given r, Player I's intital move is given
by:
x[ = A* PL, for all t, r with po > 0. Po (c) If Player I's first move is t then he selects his move in Btr according to (Pt, 1) in (1).
PROOF. From Theorem 1, it follows that the admissible set of Xt Pt, It in (a) is not empty, since L t(p, qo) c Lt(pt), hence the strategy is well defined.
We shall now prove that this strategy, denoted by o, guarantees V(po, qo) to Player I.
Assume that Player II knows a. Learning t he can compute a posterior probability on R, given a and p which is precisely Pt since we have:
Prob(r and t)
x;r Now for each q E Q, Player I can guarantee at (p, q) the amount 1, q since /, belongs to L'(p,). It remains to compute the total probability of playing t which is r, p~x[ = X so that Player I can assure himself ~, X,,-q. Hence from (a)(iii) this amount is greater or equal than 1 q so that at qo we obtain 1 qo which is precisely V(po, qo).
Note that this strategy rely only on the information Player I gives to Player II (i.e., the posteriors p,) and not on the information he can get (Player I will play in G' without computing posteriors on S but by using pt,, in (1)).
III. Applications to special cases. The implications of Theorem 2 will now be developed in the context of 0-sum games with almost perfect information. First, we shall consider games with lack of information on one side. This will have the advantage to explicitly dissociate the two problems mentioned in the introduction (using one's own information, limiting use of opponent's information) thus giving rise to simpler structure for optimal strategies. After some general considerations (part A) we shall study two examples of sequential repeated games (part B). In the first one, the informed player is playing in the second position. The second example where the informed player in playing first was studied in Ponssard and Zamir (1973) . Then in part C we shall illustrate the case of lack of information on both sides through poker-type games (Example 3).
A. Games with lack of information on one side: General considerations. Let us give additional notation:
(i) the finite game tree G is assumed to consist in a succession of moves il, j.. . i,, j,t . . . in' jn in which it belongs to some fixed set I for Player I and j, to some fixed set J for Player II; a partial history of G, noted h, consists of a sequence of moves starting from the beginning of the game tree; (it will be noted by h' if the number of moves is even, h" otherwise; moreover h'i denote the history h' followed by i and similarly for h "j). 
PROOF. These strategies are merely the counterpart of Theorem 2 and its development all along the game tree G since any restricted game may be viewed as a compounded game through appropriate normalization. For Player I, the informed player, the notation of supporting hyperplane is reduced to its simplest form (the cardinality of S is one). Then, condition (3) may be directly expressed in terms of the points Vh'i(ph,i) and this is precisely condition (ii).
For Player II, the noninformed player, it is the notion of conditional probabilities that becomes trivial. Condition (iv) is exactly condition (3) but taken from Player II's point of view.
COROLLARY 2. The set of conditional probabilities Ph is a martingale over P, the set of conditional hyperplanes mh is decreasing in expectation over all P.
Furthermore, for all partial histories h that may occur with a positive probability when both players use optimal strategies we have: 2 Mrph= vh(ph). rER 
PROOF. The first two statements follow from Corollary 1, as for the last statement it merely means that if Player II were to be revealed Ph, then he could not obtain more than the value of the restricted game initiated by h and with a starting probability distribution po = Ph'
It may be interesting to give a graphical interpretation of the construction of the optimal strategies in the simplest case IR I = 2.
Starting at some Ph', Player I's strategy will generate conditional probabilities on P as depicted in Figure 1. It should be observed that Player I's optimal strategy is conditioned over the sequence of probabilities which he generates himself: whereas he knows the r selected by chance, the martingale on P is a state variable that keeps track of what he revealed through his past moves thus generating a new starting point for the future. This idea has been present in the literature from the very beginning (Aumann and Maschler, 1966).
Player II's optimal strategy does not rely on posterior probabilities on P such as guessing some Ph and then maximizing an expected payoff at this point. Although by Corollary 2 it is consistent with Bayerian learning, it appears to be best interpreted in a vector framework. Consider the value function Vh". By construction Vh" = Min( Vh" , Vh"2). The recursive construction of an optimal strategy for Player II has the following graphical counterpart. For any supporting hyperplane to Vh", say mh", find two supporting hyperplanes to Vh " and Vh"2, respectively, such that a linear combination of these two is everywhere below mh" . The coefficients of this combination give the probabilities of the respective moves. Once Player II's move is made the hyperplane for future reference becomes either mh " or mh 2. Thus, Player II's optimal strategy is conditioned at each stage by a set of successive hyperplanes each of which appears as a vector payoff that should be secured over the remaining stages of the game. This construction has a similar feature with the construction of an optimal strategy for the noninformed player in infinitely repeated games, called the "Blackwell Strategy" (Aumann, Maschler, 1966), The initial probability distribution po plays a role only through the specification of some supporting hyperplane. Then this hyperplane 10 defines a set A= {Ie RR r<<or VrE^} and Player II is now playing a game with vector-payoffs, each component corresponding to a state r, as defined by Blackwell (1956 ). An optimal strategy for Player II will then approach A (that is, with probability one, the distance between the average n The successive Vn(q) are easily derived and it can be seen that Vn(q)/n is constant for n > 3. Note that a behavioral strategy for each player is constructed in four steps since it gives the move at each stage given the past history. (2,0) . Hence Player I has to play 1 with probability one and 134141 = 134151 = (2,0) (see Fig. 2(b) ).
If h = 3434 the relevant vector security level is (2,0). Hence Player I has to play 1 with probability one and 134341 = (2, 0).
If h = 3435 we start with 13435 -a35 = (0, 2). Hence Player I plays 2 with probability one and 134351 = (0,2).
(6) Third step for Player II. If Player II's move at this step is relevant (i.e., after a move 3 by Player I, which is nonoptimal given the past history) then the optimal move is to play completely revealing, i.e., 4 if s = 1 and 5 if s = 2. (7) Fourth step for Player I. -if h = 341xly (recall that Player II's move after move 1 of the Player I is irrelevant) Player I's optimal move is to play 1 with probability one;
-if h = 34341x same result as above; -if h = 34352x Player I's optimal move is to play 2 with probability one. Let us discuss the optimal strategies along the following remarks. REMARK 
Let u(q) = maxi minj aJqs. Then the value of the infinitely repeated game is given by V(q) = Vex u(q). (Aumann, Maschler, 1966).
Hence from Figure 5 it follows that the optimal first move of the informed player in this four-stage game is his first optimal move in the infinitely repeated game.
Whereas in that case he should retain the conditional probabilities (2/3,1/3) or (1/3,2/3) for the rest of the game, here we observe the end play effect: the informed player does not care about revealing information at the end and it is quite advantageous if the opportunity arises. It is not known whether this kind of structure for an optimal strategy is true in general.
Observe that, in spite of the fact that V3/3 = V4/4 the optimal strategies for Player II at the first step in both games are not the same. 
REMARK 2. The "Blackwell strategy" for Player I (the uninformed player) in the infinitely repeated game would approach the set A = {(x, y) E R 2; x > 2/3, y > 2/3). With our notations this means that the "security level" vector would be (2/3,2/3). Note that in our construction it is (2n/3,2n/3) at stage n, for n > 3 (the average vector payoff being (2/3,2/3)), then it becomes (2n/3,2(n -3)/3) if Player II's first move is 4 for example, etc.
Moreover Player I needs to randomize in order to achieve some security level vectors whereas in the Blackwell strategy for sequential games he does not have to randomize in order to approach the set A. Again, we observe similarities and differences.
Note that the optimal strategy of the noninformed player makes intuitive sense about information usage. The observation of a move 4 by Player I is a sign that s = 1 is more likely thus triggering a move 1 in response, whereas a move 5 triggers a move 2. But in order to avoid being bluffed, Player I has to come back from time to time to move 3 which may be interpreted as an investment for information. As we said earlier, this "story" need not be true; Player I's strategy is a maximin strategy. EXAMPLE 2. (the trap phenomenon revisited). We shall show here that there are many more optimal strategies for the noninformed player than the one given in a previous paper (Ponssard and Zamir, 1973), some of them exploiting mistakes more than others. The idea of supporting hyperplane will enable us to formulate more precisely the "trap phenomenon" pointed out in Ponssard (1976) .
Let us consider the following sequential game where Player I, the maximizer, is informed and plays first. The game is as follows: Let us now consider the two stage game G2(l/2) and compute optimal strategies. (a) First step for Player I. From Figure 7 below it follows that the strategy at this step is the same as in G,(l/2). =(1,4)mi4=(3,0) andU,l3= 1/2~14= 1/2.
(1,0) (0,1)
FIGURE 8
Let us suppose that Player II plays 4. (c) Second step for Player I given the history 14. The construction of V14 is given in Figure 9 . Since P14 = (2/3,1/3 ) the only optimal move is 1. = (1,4) it is not.
Let us now conclude with some remarks. REMARK 1. (Comparison with the optimal strategies exhibited in Ponssard and Zamir, 1973). Player II's set of optimal strategies is enlarged. In the earlier paper, only strategy (b)(3) was used. In terms of exploiting the opponents' mistake we just showed that this is possible only by selecting (b)(1) or (b)(2) with some positive probability. Of course any optimal strategy is good enough to secure the value of the game, but in a game in extensive form one may ask for more. REMARK 2. The fact that the exploitation of a mistake at the second stage need be prepared is made explicit by the fact that it crucially depends on which hyperplane is selected at the first stage. But, we fail to see intuitively why (b)(1) or (b)(2) should be preferred to (b)(3) by only considering V23 and V24. REMARK 3. The interested reader will note that the algorithm proposed in Ponssard (1975) to recursively obtain the optimal strategies breaks down in such an example because of the following degeneracy: V'3 and V14 precisely intersects at the point at which they are kinked. C. Games with lack of information on both sides: a poker type game. Just as chess, poker has always been a reference for game theory. From an economic point of view, poker may be considered as a rough model of escalation with incomplete information, and many extensions, involving nonzero sum elements, are certainly worth studying. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the development of games with incomplete information provides new tools for the analysis of such situations.
The following model is simply used as an illustration of the recursive computation of optimal strategies and certainly not as a contribution to poker itself. The most striking simplifications are the number of players, the number of cards, the independence of the chance moves, the lack of interaction between successive plays which in practice gives rise to a survival problem.
1. Description of the game. The following "poker game" is a generalization of The only solution appears to be XRR = qO(2m + n)/(m + n + 1), RC = 1 -RR -RD, RD = l/(n + 1).
Player II's optimal move is derived as:
-if H play R, -if L play R with probability (ml)qQ/(m + n + 1)(1qo), play C with probability (n/(n + 1) -q0(2m + n)/(m + n + ))/(l -qo) play D with probability l/(n + 1)(1qo). (c) Player I's optimal second move. Again, we may assume that R is played by Player II since otherwise the game ends. We start with PRR = PR = (n + 1)/(n + 2) and RR = (n, -(n + 2)m/(n + m + 1)). 'RR is tangent to VRR at q = (m + n + 1)/ (2m + n). This gives the relevant rectangles of VRR (in fact all of them at this stage). (4) Remarks. The structure of the optimal strategies may be summarized through the values they generate on the spaces of the state variables. As a numerical example, let m = n = 2 and Po = qo = 1/2. In terms of conditional probabilities the optimal strategies would, for instance, reveal the following information: Player I's first move is R; then the probability that he has a high card goes from 1/2 to 3/4. Player II's move is R; then his probability of having a high card goes from 1/2 to 5/6. Player I's second move is a drop; his probability of having a high card goes from 3/4 to 3/8 (see Figure 12 ). But the optimal strategies do not use the information "revealed" by the opponent. They are based on a sequence of vector security levels (see Figures 13 and  14) . For instance at the first stage Player I secures a vector payoff m0= (4/3, -16/15).
In this example Corollary 2 says that for any history which occurs with a positive probability given the optimal strategies, we have: 
